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TREASON AT QUEBEC: 
BRITISH ESPIONAGE IN CANADA 
DURING THE WINTER OF 1759-1760 
D. Peter MacLeod 
I n the spring of 1760, the British garrison at Quebec, commanded by James Murray,1 
found itself the target of a French army intent 
upon the recapture of the colonial capital. Led 
by the exceptionally able Francois de Levis,2 
the French hoped to surpr ise Murray's 
outnumbered and isolated army,3 but even as 
the French embarked at Montreal on 20 May, 
Murray was writing that he had "received certain 
intelligence" of French preparations and taken 
appropriate precautions.4 Much of this 
foreknowledge came from British spies working 
behind the French lines. Although prior to 
September 1759 the British had not possessed 
a single operative in Canada, Quebec, now in 
British hands, became the base for a modest 
espionage organization which proved capable 
of scattering informants throughout the towns 
and countryside of New France and recruiting 
at least one agent in the confidence of the very 
highest officials of the colonial administration. 
The British strategists who planned the attack upon Quebec in 1759 had given 
little consideration to gathering information 
regarding the deployment of French forces. No 
attempt was made to recruit spies who might 
report upon conditions in Canada. When 
Major-General James Wolfe and Admiral Sir 
Charles Saunders ascended the St. Lawrence, 
their best intelligence came from the reports of 
British officers who had been taken prisoner in 
the interior and later exchanged, and the fifteen-
year-old History and General Description of 
New France by Pierre Charlevoix.5 
This indifference to espionage was typical 
of the British in North America during the 
Seven Years' War. There were no formal 
intelligence organizations attached to their 
armies in North America, and each general was 
responsible for directing the gathering of 
intelligence.6 Information was acquired through 
the reports of Amerindians, scouts, prisoners, 
and deser te r s , together with cap tu red 
documents.7 Reports from Amerindians, who 
were able to move freely between French and 
British North America, even in time of war, 
were of particular importance and frequently 
provided reliable intelligence.8 Yet the British, 
who generally enjoyed numerical superiority, 
based their planning upon their own capabilities 
and objectives, rather than those of the French.9 
This was not, however, the case in Quebec 
in the winter of 1759-1760. The capture of 
Quebec in 1759 had converted that town from 
a French colonial capital to an isolated British 
enclave deep in the heart of New France, and 
left Canada itself divided into French and 
British zones. The French retreat from Quebec 
halted at the mouth of the Jacques Cartier 
River. Fort Jacques Cartier, erected on the 
western bank, and screened by advanced posts 
at Pointe aux Trembles and Saint Augustin, 
became the French headquarters for operations 
on the new Anglo -French frontier during the 
winter of 1759-1760. From the Jacques Cartier 
River eastward, the St. Lawrence valley was 
within the reach of the British garrison of 
Quebec. A series of expeditions in the fall of 
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1759 reduced the parishes in the vicinity of 
Quebec to nominal submission, producing a 
British zone guarded by outposts at Ancienne 
Lorette10 and Sainte-Foy, which blocked the 
roads leading to Quebec. Nonetheless, the 
British had firm control only over the town of 
Quebec, and even within the walls remained 
on their guard against a generally hostile, if 
submissive, population.11 Outside Quebec, 
they travelled safely only in armed parties 
among a population that remained generally 
loyal to France.12 
Cut off from assistance from Britain or 
British North America until the spring, the 
British garrison could not afford to wait 
passively within Quebec and ignore French 
movements and intentions. If they were to 
survive the winter, the British needed supplies 
of fresh provisions and firewood, commodities 
t ha t could be obta ined only from the 
countryside. Moreover, the French forces were 
under the command of the capable and 
aggressive Levis, who could be expected to 
attempt to recover Quebec. To procure supplies, 
o u t p o s t s h a d to be 
established and patrols sent 
out into the parishes of the 
government of Quebec.13 
Resisting a major attack 
d e m a n d e d the 
concentration of Murray's 
force. Both to maintain 
access to local resources and 
to resist a major expedition, 
intel l igence of F rench 
movements and intentions 
was necessary. Should the 
British fail to obtain this 
information, the French 
would be able to strike with 
impunity, decimate British 
outposts, prevent the British 
from securing provisions 
and firewood, and finally 
assemble an army that could 
a t t a ck Quebec wi thou t 
warning. 
Some information re-
garding French capabilities 
and intentions was acquired 
from French deserters and 
pr isoners . But Murray 
considered these sources of 
intelligence to be inade-
quate, and sought a means 
of "opening and keeping up 
an intercourse with their 
[French] head quarters." 14 
This could only be 
accompl i shed t h r o u g h 
espionage. 
50 
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In spite of Murray's 
understandable desire for 
highly-placed sou rces , 
much of the information that 
he needed was not closely 
guarded. The habitants of 
the parishes of Quebec were 
aware of, and cooperated 
with, the movements of 
French d e t a c h m e n t s . 
Within the French zone, 
where troops were billeted 
among the habitants and 
military movements and 
preparations took place 
under the eyes of the 
population, even secret 
military dispatches quickly 
became common know-
ledge.15 Thus both within 
the occupied parishes of the 
Quebec area and west of the 
Jacques Car t ier River, 
valuable military intelligence 
could be secured by simply 
listening to local gossip. 
To secure th i s in-
formation, Murray needed 
individuals possessed of 
legitimate r e a s o n s for 
travelling, and thus able to 
move freely and in-
conspicuously in the 
occupied parishes of the 
government of Quebec and 
the French zone. Elsewhere 
in North America, this would 
have been very difficult. The 
frontier between the French 
at Jacques Cartier and the 
British at Quebec, however, was more 
permeable than the wilderness separating New 
France and New England. Here, war was 
conducted in a settled agricultural region where 
a semblance of normal life continued under 
British military occupation. Indeed, following 
the capitulation of Quebec, a flourishing 
commerce had developed between the French 
and British zones. By 25 November, Murray 
was angrily aware "that the [British] merchants, 
ever greedy of gain, to purchase furs had 
transmitted a good deal of cash to Montreal."16 
In January 1760, a French officer noted that 
"We hear from [Fort] Jacques Cartier that a 
means has been found to obtain many things 
from Quebec."17 As a result of this trade, 
according to one of Levis' aides de camp, during 
the winter of 1759-1760 "there was established 
an intercourse between the English at Quebec 
and the French at James [Jacques] Cartier, as 
if it had been in time of peace."18 Some of these 
t ravel lers were undoub ted ly legi t imate 
merchants, quietly going about their business. 
But the ease with which merchants could 
51 
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travel across the Anglo-French frontier and 
within the British zone made them the potential 
spies that Murray required. 
In the last weeks of September 1759, the 
Bri t ish, obliged to pu rchase locally to 
supplement their own resources, had quickly 
established contact with the local merchant 
community. Within a week of the capitulation 
of Quebec, Canadians, who found British hard 
currency more attractive than discounted 
French bills of exchange, were supplying the 
British with fresh vegetables.19 "Everyone in 
Quebec," wrote Francois Bigot,20 the Intendant 
of New France, "thinks of restoring his fortunes 
and little of the interests of the king and the 
colony."21 
Some of these merchants were drawn by 
the British into espionage and treason. They 
were recruited by two captains of the 15th 
(Amherst's) Regiment, James Barbutt and 
Hector Theophilus Cramahe, to whom Murray 
had entrusted the responsibility for "the 
management of the spies."22 The details of 
these recruitments were not recorded, but 
Thomas Pichon, who became a British spy as 
early as 1754, later recalled that: 
. . . [Captain George] Scott, whom I had met at 
Louisbourg, and who was in command at Fort 
Lawrence, close to the French fort [Beausejour] asked 
me to go to see him. In the course of our conversations 
about the respective interests of the two Crowns in 
North America, he gave me to understand that he 
could make my fortune, that he knew of means which 
were very safe, and that I should have no cause for 
regret if I accepted his proposal.23 
52 
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(Artist unknown, NAC C3715) 
Rather than straightforward financial 
inducements, Barbutt and Cramahe offered 
potential spies and couriers the means to 
continue their business. In a colony where 
goods of all kinds were in short supply, 
merchants who agreed to work for the British 
gained access to large quantities of materiel 
seized from French government stores.24 To 
dispose of their merchandise outside the walls 
of Quebec, merchants needed permission from 
the military authorities to leave the town. 
Those who coopera ted with Murray ' s 
spymasters could expect to receive passports 
allowing them to travel freely. In return, it was 
expected that in the course of disposing of their 
merchandise in the parishes of the government 
of Quebec or in the French zone, these 
merchants would gather information of use to 
the British. 
The possession of articles that could be 
obtained only from British sources was 
plausibly explained, and treasonous dealings 
with the British government partly concealed, 
by the presence of a large group of British 
merchants in the colony.25 Contacts with 
Br i t i sh mil i tary a u t h o r i t i e s could be 
camouflaged by regulations tha t obliged 
travellers to obtain permission to enter or leave 
Quebec and to travel in the neighbouring 
parishes of the French zone.26 
Once recruited, some of these spies 
remained behind British lines and roamed 
throughout the occupied zone, buying and 
selling various commodities, and all the while 
collecting information which would never have 
been given to a British patrol, then returning to 
Quebec to report their findings.27 More 
ambitious operations involved outfitting 
merchants with goods that were in demand in 
the French-held governments of Trois Rivieres 
and Montreal—which included brandy, wine, 
salt and other provisions and dry goods—and 
issuing passports allowing them to pass the 
British outposts.28 Once beyond the Jacques 
Cartier River, these spies continued into French 
territory to dispose of their wares and gather 
intelligence. 
The French were aware of the danger posed 
by collaborators acting as British spies, and 
attempted to neutralize potential traitors by 
sealing off the British zone and allowing only 
authorized persons to cross the frontier. In 
mid-October of 1759, French officials had 
decided that it was "essential to establish 
control over the movements of the merchants, "29 
and those spies who first attempted to penetrate 
the French zone were turned back at French 
outposts. But at some point the British 
operatives were permitted to cross the French 
outpost line and continue westward into 
French-held territory. Murray believed that 
they were "allowed to pass, . . . from a 
53 
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persuasion, that the merchants and carriers 
being French would not betray their country. "30 
Within French-controlled territory, a careful 
watch was maintained for "suspicious persons" 
believed to be travelling "to obtain knowledge 
of our movements."31 These individuals were 
liable to be "arrested as spies."32 Unfortunately, 
for the French, their precautions were prudent 
but misdirected. French authorities harassed 
strangers who could not account for their 
movements, but genuine British spies appeared 
to be going about their legitimate business, 
and were left in peace. 
In contemporary documents , French 
military and civil officers never voiced 
suspicions that their counter-intelligence was 
anything but effective. Not until five years after 
these events did a single allusion to the 
possibility that Canadians had been acting as 
54 
British spies appear in writing. Then, Marie-
Joseph Legardeur de Repentigny, a nun of the 
General Hospital of Quebec, suggested that 
French partisan operations during the winter 
of 1759-1760 had been compromised by 
collaborators.33 
The work of British spies in Canada was by 
nature confidential, and generated little 
documentation. Only two of these spies can be 
identified by name.34 One of Murray's less 
reliable sources of information was Eli Laparre, 
a Quebec surgeon and generally unsuccessful 
entrepreneur.35 At some point following the 
capitulation of Quebec, the surgeon-merchant 
became involved in a new venture. "In the 
winter of 1759," wrote Murray, Laparre "was 
employed by me as a spy."36 
Recruited by Barbutt and Cramahe, Laparre 
was given a passport to carry "some trifling 
merchandize to Montreal."37 He returned, very 
probably on the evening of 6 February 1760, 
and reported that the French planned to send 
a large detachment to the parishes below 
Quebec to secure flour and cattle.38 Murray, 
however, did not entirely trust Laparre or his 
information, and was uncertain regarding the 
numbers and intentions of the French. Rather 
than acting immediately, he "determined to 
wait till this was clear'd up."39 Not until six 
days later, when Laparre's "intelligence [was]... 
confirmed by spies I had more dependence 
upon," did Murray dispatch a detachment of 
light infantry which drove off the French force. 
At the same time, he gave several of his 
informers passports which allowed them to 
trade with the habitants for furs and other 
goods, and "desired La Parre and others to go 
to the lower parishes and give me information 
of the enemy's motions."40 
Laparre, however, promptly disappeared, 
and employed the freedom of movement 
conferred by his passport to travel to Tadoussac 
to recover debts by seizing property in the 
King's Posts.41 He managed to make a 
satisfactory explanation for his conduct to the 
British authorities in September of 1760, but 
was later reported to be outfitting privateers in 
Saint Paul's Bay and arrested. Following the 
cession of Canada, Laparre continued his 
medical practice and commercial activities, 
Thomas Pichon 
(painting by Henri Beau, NAC CI 0608) 
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but enjoyed no be t t e r for tune as an 
entrepreneur under the British than the 
French.42 
Other spies proved more reliable and 
generated a steady flow of intelligence regarding 
French movements. When the Captains of 
Militia of the southern parishes attempted to 
mislead Murray regarding the French, the 
British general was undeceived, as he had 
"rec'd information that most of the Captains 
[had] made false reports."43 
However important the tactical intelligence secured by Laparre and his anonymous 
fellows might be, Murray was most in need of 
information regarding the apprehended siege 
of Quebec by the F rench . Even as 
inconspicuous informers controlled by Barbutt 
and Cramahe scurried about the countryside, 
the planning of a spring offensive against 
Murray's isolated garrison was underway at 
the French headquarters in Montreal. Those 
involved included the most senior officers of 
the French armed forces and colonial 
administration, together with a number of 
private individuals. Among the latter was a 
leading Quebec merchant, Barthelemy Martin. 
Born in Marseilles, Martin emigrated to Canada 
prior to 1749, and quickly established "one of 
the most important trading companies in 
Quebec towards the end of the French regime."44 
When he married, the marriage contract was 
witnessed by the Governor-General, Intendant, 
and Bishop.45 
Martin left Quebec towards the end of 
December 1759. When he arrived in Montreal, 
the Quebec merchant, long accustomed to 
dealing with the highest levels of the colonial 
government, contacted Francois Bigot, and 
informed him that he had access to stocks of 
goods in Quebec.46 Later that winter, when the 
French found themselves in need of "certain 
indispensable articles which could not be found 
within the [French-held area] of the colony," 
and sought to obtain them covertly from the 
British zone,47 Martin became involved in 
logistical preparations for the most important 
military operation of the French regime—the 
attempt to save the colony by recapturing 
Quebec. 
One commodity was of particular concern 
to Levis, who had been designated commander 
of the siege force. He informed the Governor-
General of New France, Pierre de Rigaud de 
Vaudreuil,48 who was also the commander-in-
chief of the French armed forces in North 
America, that "it is indispensable to include a 
mis erabfe49 of brandy in the ration of the soldiers 
and militiamen destined to take part in the 
siege of Quebec."50 Vaudreuil passed on this 
request to Bigot, who reported that of the three 
hundred quarts51 of brandy that would be 
required, only fifty could be purchased in the 
Montreal area. However, the Intendant added 
that Barthelemy Martin was in a position to 
procure brandy from Quebec.52 Vaudreuil 
agreed to authorize the necessary expenditure, 
and Martin was consequently asked to "obtain 
from Quebec about 250 quarts of brandy which 
will be delivered to the magazines of the King at 
[Fort] Jacques Cartier."53 
Martin then presented a memoir to Bigot, 
in which he formally stated that he had left 
about two hundred quarts of brandy behind in 
Quebec with his associate, Tropez Martin, and 
could secure further supplies from British 
merchants. He agreed to arrange for the 
purchase of this brandy, and to "make other 
payments. . . in order to have the liberty to 
remove the brandy from Quebec."54 The helpful 
entrepreneur could have added that both his 
brandy and his ability to export commodities 
from the British zone had been acquired through 
the good offices of Barbutt and Cramahe, in 
exchange for Martin's agreement to become a 
spy.55 
With a contract in hand, Martin met with 
the Governor-General to discuss the enterprise. 
Vaudreuil, who considered the procurement of 
a supply of brandy for the army to be of great 
importance to the colony, "on account of the 
rigour of the season and because the army will 
be deprived of all comforts,"56 instructed Martin 
"to make haste and spare nothing for this 
operation." He granted the merchant "complete 
liberty to go to Pointe aux Trembles, to St. 
Augustin, and even to Quebec, if he judged it 
expedient," and ordered the commandant at 
Fort Jacques Cartier to provide whatever horses 
and vehicles might be needed to transport 
Martin's wares from Quebec.57 
55 
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Soon after 7 March, Martin left Montreal. 
Two days later, the British spy was on the 
frontier and preparing to open communications 
with Quebec.58 Martin's actual movements 
during this period are uncertain, but the use of 
one Tache, who had already managed to ship 
"some beverages" from Quebec, as a messenger 
or intermediary was recorded.59 In the last 
week of March, Martin secured the services of 
Tache, who returned to Quebec "to fulfil the 
object of his [Martin's] mission."60 By 1 April, 
working through Tache, Martin successfully 
delivered fifty minots61 of salt, and sent Tache 
back to acquire more merchandise.62 At the 
same time, Martin made contact with the British 
authorities and began to supply intelligence 
regarding French preparations for the siege of 
Quebec. 
As he embarked upon the campaign, Levis 
considered it "essential to arrive in front of 
Quebec before the enemy learned of our 
march."63 He believed that the secret of the 
French advance had been kept from 20 April 
when his army left Montreal until it reached a 
point about twenty kilometres south-west of 
Quebec on 27 April. It was only there, to his 
knowledge, that the British were "then informed 
of our march," when the sole survivor of a 
wrecked bateaux drifted downriver and was 
rescued at Quebec.64 
In fact, even as the French army departed 
from Montreal, Murray was warning his officers 
that an attack could be expected shortly. As 
early as 28 March the British general had been 
informed that the French were preparing their 
vessels at Sorel for "an early expedition in the 
spring."65 Four days later, he received "fresh 
intelligence. . . of the designs of the French."66 
Finally, on 17 April, "the best intelligence was 
now procur'd," regarding Levis' intentions.67 
According to this information, the French 
planned to open their campaign by "making 
themselves masters of the embouchure of the 
River Caprouge, the most convenient place for 
disembarking their artillery & stores, and for 
securing their retreat," then marching on 
Quebec.68 The source of this intelligence is not 
specifically ment ioned in Murray ' s 
contemporary letters or diary, but Martin's 
arrival on the frontier coincided with the 
beginning of a series of reports concerning 
56 
French activities, and Murray later credited 
Martin with betraying the details of French 
plans for a spring offensive.69 
Murray based his plans for the initial stages 
of the defence of Quebec upon this information. 
He decided to forestall the French by 
establishing a redoubt on the high ground 
overlooking the mouth of the Cap Rouge River: 
. . . in order to hinder the enemy from landing their 
cannon in the river, and to oblige them to bring it 
round by land [by way of Lorette], which, considering 
the badness of the road, would in that case delay 
their operations a considerable time.70 
Construction of the redoubt began on 17 
April. Eight days later,the exposed garrison of 
Ancienne Lorette was withdrawn to Sainte-
Foy.71 On 24 April, a highland officer noted 
that "the General seems certain that the French 
are preparing to come and attack the place, 
and will, he says, be here in a very few days."72 
This prediction, and the intelligence it was 
based upon, proved correct. On 26 April, the 
French army disembarked at St. Augustin, 
about seven kilometres west of the Cap Rouge 
River. As Murray had hoped, Levis elected to 
march inland from there to Ancienne Lorette, 
then follow a road leading from Ancienne Lorette 
to Sainte-Foy.73 
This delay cost the French the advantage of 
tactical surprise. During the night of 26-27 
April, the British were informed by the rescued 
Frenchman of the French landing and march 
on Ancienne Lorette. On 27 April, Murray 
marched with part of his garrison to Sainte-
Foy, where he encountered the French force 
marching southward from Ancienne Lorette. 
Finding himself outnumbered, and about to be 
outflanked, Murray withdrew the garrisons at 
Cap Rouge and Sainte-Foy, then retreated 
safely to Quebec.74 
Murray's outpost at Cap Rouge had, as he 
had hoped, "obliged them [the French] to land 
their army twenty miles higher up, and to 
risque a battle without artillery after a march 
of thirty miles."75 But whatever advantages 
this may have gained for Murray, on the next 
morning he followed Montcalm's example by 
abandoning a strong position on the Buttes a 
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Neveu, and charged downhill to defeat in the 
Battle of Sainte-Foy.76 
Although he lost the battle, Murray won 
the campaign by withdrawing to Quebec and 
enduring a siege that lasted from 29 April to 17 
May 1760.77 French operations during this 
siege were crippled by the lack of an artillery 
train that would have enabled them to batter 
down the walls of Quebec. In its absence, Levis 
pinned his hopes for success upon the arrival 
of assistance from France. When a British 
squadron appeared on the river below Quebec, 
Levis lifted the siege and withdrew with his 
army towards Montreal. There are no references 
to British intelligence operations during the 
siege, but immediately after the French 
departed, Barbutt and Cramahe reestablished 
contact with their spies. By 25 May, these 
agents, together with prisoners and deserters, 
had provided sufficient information regarding 
shortages of provisions and munitions among 
the French to convince Murray that Levis was 
no longer in a position to threaten the British 
in Quebec.78 
The financial details of Martin's transactions 
are somewhat obscure. He appears to have 
given to the British eight thousand livres in 
bills of exchange drawn on his Parisian banker 
for the brandy, which he subsequently sold to 
the French for 554,677 livres 10 sols.79 In the 
event, as of 1765 he had neither paid the 
British, nor been paid by the French.80 After 
the surrender of Montreal, Martin returned to 
France to attempt to collect the money owed to 
him by the French crown. There, he became 
involved in the investigation of Vqffaire du 
Canada, but as a witness, rather than a 
defendant.81 Martin may never have collected 
his money, but he emerged from the financial 
scandals surrounding the fall of New France 
with his reputation intact, and remained known 
to all but a few British officers as a loyal French 
subject who had done his best to contribute to 
the defence of Canada under the most difficult 
conditions. 
I n September of 1759, the residents of the government of Quebec found themselves 
under the rule of an occupying army. Out of a 
range of possible responses, from violent 
resistance to wholehearted collaboration, tens 
of thousands of these Canadians elected to 
cooperate with the British to a limited extent, 
by surrendering their arms, taking a nominal 
oath of allegiance, and obeying British 
ordinances, while reserving their ultimate 
allegiance to France and assisting the French 
armed forces whenever possible. 
Loyalty, however, can be an extremely fragile 
commodity. Every society contains within it 
individuals who will betray their loyalty to 
crown, state or collectivity for personal 
advantage. Canadians in 1759 and 1760 proved 
themselves to be no better and no worse than 
any other people. 
In Murray ' s opinion, no Canad ian 
supported the British on account of any sense 
of discontent with the French or appreciation 
of their new rulers. Those who collaborated did 
so in return for material incentives, "as no 
57 
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other consideration could engage them to act 
for us."82 These considerations included cash 
payments, military rations and access to scarce 
commodities t ha t could be resold at a 
considerable profit. 
An unknown number of Canadians became 
purveyors of provisions to the British garrison. 
Others were employed "for the purposes of 
carting and bringing in fuel for the garrison" 
and as "spies, pilots, artificers, [or] clerks."83 
The best known of these collaborators were the 
pilots who guided British fleets up the St. 
Lawrence in 1759 and 1760, thereby earning 
themselves a small but prominent place in 
Canadian demonology.84 The role of Canadians 
who provided the British with military 
intelligence, on the other hand, has been all 
but ignored. 
The British hold on Quebec during the 
winter of 1759-1760 was precarious, and 
Murray depended upon intell igence to 
anticipate French actions to a greater degree 
than other British generals in North America 
during the Seven Years' War. In the months 
following the capitulation of Quebec, James 
Barbutt and Hector Cramahe succeeded in 
building an effective intelligence network. This 
would not have been possible without the 
active cooperation of French merchants who 
collected and delivered this information. 
These merchants may have betrayed the 
French and collaborated with the British, but 
their highest loyalty was to themselves. Jus t 
as the British used them to gather intelligence, 
they used the British to acquire resources that 
they needed to further their private interests. 
Laparre employed his British passport to obtain 
the freedom of movement that he needed to 
collect money owed to him by travelling to the 
King's Posts and seizing merchandise. Martin 
used the British as a source of commodities 
which he hoped to sell for a considerable profit. 
When their connections with the British ceased 
to be of use to them, these spies, at least in the 
case of Laparre, forsook the British as readily 
as they had the French. But whatever their 
ultimate loyalties, they provided the British 
with a steady flow of information. 
58 
This intelligence was of considerable value 
to Murray. His outnumbered and isolated 
garrison was confronted by an enemy whose 
skill in partisan warfare had ben demonstrated 
many times in the course of the war, fighting on 
intimately familiar territory in defence of their 
homes. Yet throughout the winter of 1759-
1760 it was the French rather than the British 
who were consis tent ly ou tmaneuvered . 
Intelligence supplied by Laparre, and others 
like him, enabled Murray to anticipate the 
actions of the French, and take appropriate 
countermeasures. He withdrew exposed 
patrols, reinforced threatened outposts, drove 
off French detachments and struck at the 
French advanced positions before they could 
threaten the British.85 In the course of that 
winter, said Murray, "The enemy made several 
attempts upon me which were entirely baffled 
by the timely notice I had of their enterprizes."86 
Throughout the winter, Murray had received 
word of plans for campaigns against Quebec 
that never materialized.87 When the French 
finally began preparations in earnest, it was 
Martin's reports that revealed to Murray that 
these activities were actually underway and 
the approximate date of the French attack.88 
Thanks to this spy, said Murray, "When their 
army assembled in the spring I had early 
notice."89 Martin's warning thwarted Levis' 
attempts to surprise the British, but did not 
enable Murray to win a victory at the Battle of 
Sainte-Foy. This defeat, however, was the 
product of mistakes in the field, not faulty 
intelligence. 
In the winter of 1759-1760, Barbutt and 
Cramahe fulfilled Murray's goal of establishing 
a line of communication between French 
headquarters at Montreal and the British 
outpost at Quebec. During that time, Murray 
was provided with clear and accurate estimates 
of French capabilities and intentions. This 
intelligence helped the beleaguered British 
garrison to exploit the resources of the parishes 
sur rounding Quebec, neutral ize French 
attempts to do the same and prepare for the 
French attack upon Quebec. Seven years after 
the campaign, Murray himself paid tribute 
both to the efficacy and the economy of his 
espionage network: 
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Every Body will allow I had good Intelligence,. . . no 
man had better. I am sure no army ever wanted it 
more, and that no nation ever paid less for it.90 
The search for an explanation for the fall of 
New France has long fascinated historians, 
who continue to weigh the relative significance 
of, among other things, British military and 
naval preponderance, French imperial policy 
and French tactical errors in decisive battles.91 
Subsidiary to these factors, but nonetheless 
important, was the presence of traitors among 
the Canadians, who became British spies. The 
information that they provided to James Murray 
during the winter of 1759-1760 cannot be 
overlooked in any assessment of the conditions 
that facilitated the successful consolidation of 
the lodgement established by the siege of 
Quebec in 1759, and thus contributed to the 
British conquest of New France. 
I would like to thank S. Barry Cottam and Professor 
Cornelius J. Jaenen, of the Department of History, 
University of Ottawa, who were kind enough to read and 
comment upon earlier versions of this paper. 
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